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Ethics and Medicine 
Arthur J. Dyck 
t of the human subject is absolutely essential. Th• !:::n:o::::atZ~ ~:::: involved b~:~:·:x~:;i:e•e::! ~~:;:t:/;h!~::. c;~~~;~ 
should be so situated as to be a eit duress over-reachan~ 
the intenention of any element o~ t:torce, fraudio' n~ecand' should' have sufficiel 
I · t: m of constraan or coerc • , or other u tenor or h . f the elements of the subject matter involve 
knowledge and compre ens•on o d t ding and enlightened decision. Th 
as to enable him to make an un ers an tance of an affirmative decisio 
latter element requires t~at before ~he ~c';:p made known to him the naturr 
by the experimental subject there s. ou , e methods and means by whir 
duration, and purpose of t~e experl.ment, th~ hazards reasonably to be e .. 
it is to be conducted; all mconvemences an h' h may possibly con 
pected; and the effects upon his ~ealth of person w •c . 
from his participation in the expenment. . 
1 Articles of the Nuremberg Tnbunal 
The declarations of Nurem-
berg symbolize and express two 
significant characteristics of th_e 
contemporary situation of . medi-
cine: a heightened responstveness 
to the needs, wants and rights of 
patients; a heightened awareness 
of the increasing difficulty of know-
ing what is . right, and hence of 
knowing how best to benefit the 
The author is the Mary B. Salton-
stall Professor of Population Ethi~s 
at the Harvard School of PubliC 
Health and is a member of the 
Linacre Editorial Advisory Boa~d. 
In his essay, he seeks "some cla~lty 
b 1 the way in which ethical a ou d ' 1 questions arise within me ICa 
practice" and suggests "a fr~me.~ 
work for formulating moral policy. 
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patient and prevent har~. . lese 
concerns have arisen wtthtr the 
medical profession itself, but hey 
are shared by the public at rge. 
Technological advances that 
make it possible to transplat or-
gans and keep the ~ea~t and 
1 
Jngs 
going when the brat~ . ts no . nger 
functioning, the abthty to liag-
nose genetic defects _whil.' the 
developing child is sttll_ 11 the 
· t t with womb, the expenmen a ton 't 
techniques that would ma e . I 
possible to grow babies o tsJde 
the womb, the rising cost• and 
complexity of delivering .tealth 
care with its adverse effet ,s on 
h . t ·e of the poor, and t e exts en~.: 
medical experiments that ar~ of 
no immediate benefit to pJtlent~ 
who are subjects, are all fads o 
modern li fe known and re!lected 
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upon not only by physicians but 
also by the public, and by the 
media that conveys so much of 
this information -to the public. 
The past decade has given rise 
to a flurry of literature that docu-
ments and agonizes over moral 
dilemmas within contemporary med-
icine. Some of this ·literature is de-
signed to shock and alarm us. T hus, 
for example, Pappworth writes a 
book entitled Human Guinea Pigs 
in which a number of cases are 
cited as clear deviations from the 
morality of traditional medical 
practice.2 Within the profession, 
Henry Beecher, in a widely read 
essay, discussed cases that he judged 
to be violations of existing medi-
cal codes, and hence unethical. 3 
One cause for alarm, then, among 
those · who are reflecting upon con-
temporary medical practice arises 
from perceived departures from 
traditional values, including those 
already embodied in medical codes. 
Quite another kind of a larm is 
being expressed, this by people 
who tend to assume that techno-
logical innovations in medicine 
and medical science are generally 
good and ought to be vigorously 
pursued. Such writers express the 
concern that traditional values -
often the focus is on religious val-
ues - continue to stand in the 
way of medical innovation and 
progress.• Whereas people used 
to oppose surgery, blood trans-
fusions, innoculations, etc., now 
they oppose new definitions of 
death, transplants, in-vitro fertili -
zation, etc. Some of these writers, 
therefore, are inclined to call for 
nothing less than a new ethic that 
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will clarify the benefits of medi-
cal innovation and the necessity 
of assuming various risks in order 
to get these benefits. s 
Decision-Making 
Sharp differences of opinion 
evoke still another kind of reac-
tion to the morally problematic 
character of contemporary medi-
cal decision-making. We see this, 
for example, in the area of employ-
ing a technique like amniocente-
sis.s To justify the risks of this 
diagnostic technique to discover 
whether the child developing in 
the womb has certain defects, 
physicians often leave the decision 
in the hands of the pregnant wom-
an. She is the one who will decide 
whether she will have an abortion 
should her developing child be 
diagnosed as defective. This ap-
proach to medical decision-making 
is one of individualizing those de-
cisions because individuals differ 
as to whether or when abortion 
for defective fetuses is morally 
justifiable. 
Sharply contrasting with the 
tendency to individualize medi-
cal decisions is a call for much 
more stringent regulation of the 
medical profession, whether by 
the legislatures, government agen-
cies, and/or the courts. 7 The de-
sire for more stringent regulation 
comes from those who wish to see 
time-honored formulations of mor-
al values enforced. It comes also 
from those who want to see new 
values enshrined in medicine: some 
physicians, for example, seek to 
have euthanasia, mercy killing, 
legalized. 
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Whatever their merit, these re-
sponses to contemporary moral 
dilemmas in medicine are inade-
quate . They are made without ex-
plicitly offering the framework for 
understanding the relationship be-
tween ethical standards and medi-
cal practice implied by the policies 
they advocate. The purpose of this 
essay is to seek some clarity about 
the way in which ethical questions 
arise within medical practice and 
to suggest a framework for formu-
lating moral policy. Obviously this 
brief essay will only make a begin-
ning of this dual enterprise. 
debates concerning contempc y 
medical practices. Indeed, we .h 
to indicate how these three t !S 
re 
th 
n-
at 
In her fascinating study of 
more universally and gener,ally 
human values, Tamara De bo 
found that health was high 01 he 
In characterizing the nature and 
scope of ethics, it is possible to 
outline the concerns of this dis-
cipline by specifying its three 
major questions. The major ques-
tions of ethics are normative, meta-
ethical, and strategic.s Normative 
questions are raised in an effort 
to discover the most generally and 
universally recognizable values 
that specify the right- and wrong-
making characteristics of actions, 
and the goodness and badness of 
persons and various states of be-
ing. Questions of metaethics have 
as their concern the understand-
ing of the nature of moral discourse 
and the processes by which moral 
judgments and debates are decided, 
argued, and justified or criticized. 
Questions of strategy are focused 
upon the way in which moral de-
cisions are implemented and social 
policy is fo~mulated and carried 
out. What we wish to do in this 
essay is use these three types of 
questions, that serve to define the 
nature and scope of ethics, to clar-
ify the nature and scope of ethical 
list.9 Indeed, one of the el cts 
of improvements in medicine tas 
been to increase the expecta 
both physicians . and the p 
have regarding the possibilit 
achieving health and mainta 
it. The most startling achiever. 
lOS 
,(ic 
of 
ing 
nts 
of 
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of medicine, and particular! 
public health measures, has · •me 
ced 
and 
de-
in the form of greatly rec 
death rates from infectious 
communicable diseases. The 
creases in infant mortality th; re-
sult greatly raise the prospel ; of 
longevity. 
With longevity, however, ome 
increases in diseases that ffect 
aging adults, such as cance1 and 
heart disease, diseases which may 
also be related to our contl npo-
rary style of life. It is pn . iseiY 
the increased ability to pr-1Jong 
life that poses what appears to be 
the most fundamental quest1 m of 
values for the practitioner~ and 
recipients of modern medical care. 
Someone dying from cancer, for 
example, can be kept alive much 
longer than ever before. Even pa-
tients whose brains are not rune-
Linacre QuarterlY 
tioning can be fed and have their 
~earts and lungs ma intained, some-
ttmes for periods of more than two 
years. Also at the beginning of life, 
where the ability to perform abor-
tions is coupled with an increas-
ing ability to diagnose various types 
of fetal deformities, questions 
~bout the support of nascent life 
10 the womb also arise. Situations 
therefore,_ ~xist within contempo~ 
rary medJcme where the increased 
expectation for health is not al-
ways compatible with the very 
strong destre for maintaining life 
as long as possible. For as we have 
noted, there are circumsta nces 
u~der which it is possible to sus-
~~~ bodily functions under con-
dthons of extremely poor heal th. 
At the same time, it is possible 
~o choose to ha've only healthy 
mfants. 
B~t should health and a certain 
quahty of life be considered a 
more important value than life it-
self? Or to put the question an-
other_ way, is quality of life _ a 
ce~tam state of health and well-
~~~g- the dominant value by 
htch we should judge what to 
do as physicians and what we wish 
as patients or should life itself be 
the dominant value? This it seems 
to me poses one of the most criti-
~~1 and far-reaching issues in the 
tstory of ethics and medicine. 
~ r~ther startlingly candid edi-
tonal m C l;r. . a t;orma Medicine com-
pares two ethical systems with 
r~gard to their understanding of 
t e value of life .'" One is the 
Judeo-Christian ethic. This ethic 
50 the ed 't · 1 • ' a 1 ona claJms, sees life 
as n absolute value and causes 
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~hysicians to prolong a nd repair 
lt fe regardless of the cost and cir-
~umstances. Alternatively, there 
IS a new ethic that rejects the Judeo-
Christian formulation of absolute 
devotion to life. In the view of 
the editorial, the adoption of this 
~ew ethic is beginning in the prac-
t~ce of abortion where quality of 
ltfe arguments are used to give 
t~e moral justification for abor-
tiOns, and will extend to various 
forms of euthanasia. The editorial 
does not give us a very clear in-
dication as to the range of cases 
in which ~illing could be j usti-
fied by th1s new quality of life 
ethic. 
Stoicism 
This editorial exhibits a very 
penetrating grasp of one of the 
most significant moral debates in 
~ontemporary medicine. However, 
It has oversimplified the alterna-
~iv~s considerably. For one thing, 
It IS not true as the editorial a l-
leges, that the quality of life ethic 
wou_ld_ b~ a new ethic. Ironically, 
Ch~1st1antty had its beginning at 
a tn~e ~~en the high value it put 
?n tnd1v1dual life distinguished 
It sharply from other more domi-
nant religious and ethical systems. 
One s~c.h powerful phi losophy 
:-v~s St01c1sm. The Stoic could def-
mJtely justify suicide in circum-
stanc~s where a person no longer 
felt ltfe to be worthwhile. For the 
Stoic, the freedom to exercise ra-
tional control over one's own des-
tiny . was such a weighty value 
that It always provided an option 
to the continuation of one's own 
life. ' ' 
Christianity also found itself 
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in opposition to the widespread 
practices of infanticide and abor-
tion that prevailed at the time of 
its inception. Where Christianity 
came to dominate, infanticide and 
abortion came to be seen as evils. 
Laws to curb such evils came to 
be enacted.l2 The editorial claims 
that this legacy of Judaism and 
Christianity is waning, and an out-
look, which as we have noted is 
more akin to traditional Stoicism, 
is beginning to take its place. There 
is no clear evidence to support this 
assessment of trends. 
It's unfair to contrast the Judea-
Christian ethic with the new ethic 
by arguing that the former is ab-
solutistic and the latter relativistic. 
This obscures the issue of the dif-
ference between an ethic in which 
life itself is a significant value, and 
an ethic in which questions of life 
and death are always questions of 
the quality of life, so that quality 
of life and not life itself is the 
value to be weighed in relation 
to other values. 
Judaism and Christianity have 
never, except for certain of their 
sects which espouse absolute paci-
fism, taken the view that it is never 
morally justifiable to ki II. Capital 
punishment and self-defense have 
always had their defendants within 
these traditions. The just war tradi-
tion has developed a whole set of 
sophisticated criteria designed to 
constrain rulers and armed forces 
from killing, but which at the 
same time state the conditions un-
der which a war · waged in self-
defense may be just. 13 In these 
traditions, therefore, life is looked 
upon as a good in itself to which 
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each individual has a right. At 1e 
same time, however, this right ty 
be forfeited by those individ Js 
who threaten or rob others of 
their right to life. The value pl. ~d 
upon life is so weighty .that is 
not at all easy to justify ca .al 
punishment and war. These tr li-
tions have especially strong ·n-
straints against killing any i o-
cent party, that is, any indivt ml 
who could in no sense be tn-
strued as being an in,tentl 1al 
threat or danger to the life of 1y-
one else. Hence the prohib on 
against infanticide did take ar lb-
solute form. 
A quality of life ethic doe• aot 
treat life as a good in itself. ife 
as a value is always life of a ·er-
tain kind and the right to I! · is 
always subject to question : it an-
not be assumed. 
To see how this ethic func ms, 
consider the following cas, of 
a Mongoloid (Downs Syndr me) 
child who was deliberately all wed 
to die.t4 Soon after birth it was 
discovered that a child, diag Jsed 
as Mongoloid, required su . ,ery. 
T his surgery does involve ome 
risks but is usually successfu and 
permits a child to realize its i 1ysi-
cal potential. Obviously it does 
nothing for whatever degr• ~ of 
mental retardation the child 1 ould 
experience as a Mongoloid Al-
though mentally retarded, M, ngol-
oids are usually happy inJivid-
uals and may sometimes n:•mage 
a degree of independence that in-
cludes earning one's own living 
and setting up an indepl!ndent 
household. In this particular case, 
the parents did not give pcrmis-
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sion for surgery and their physi-
cian acceded to the parents' wishes. 
He ordered nothing by mouth and 
fifteen days later the infant was 
dead. 
What kind of argument led the 
participants to justify infanticide? 
On the side of the parents there 
was a strong desire to have a nor-
mal child, coupled with a very neg-
ative view of mental retardation on 
the part of the mother who had had 
some exposure to · such children. 
Both parents did not want the suf-
fering and anguish either of try-
ing to rear such a child or of in-
stitutionalizing it. Presumably they 
also did not wish a life of mental 
retardation for their child. What-
ever other assumptions were made 
by their physician, there was a 
strong feeling that institutionaliza-
tion of an undesirable quality was 
the only prospect for this child 
and, given the attitudes of the par-
ents, this was seen quite literally 
as a fate worse than death. (As it 
turned out, it was learned later 
that there are couples in that area 
who would gladly adopt mentally 
retarded children. This fact, how-
ever, is not essential to understand-
ing quality of life arguments.) 
Quality of Life 
. The essential feature of all qual-
·~. of life arguments is the propo-
Sllton that there is such a thing 
~ a life not worth living. Life 
'!SCif is not what is good: only 
hfe of a certain kind, life with a 
ce~in degree of intelligence, po-
tenttal for development, or what-
ever, !s considered valuable. Those 
W~o argue in this way will disagree 
With respect to what it is that 
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gives life value, how much of it 
one has to possess in order to have 
a right to . life, and who it is that 
has the authority to specify that 
certain individuals will not, for 
whatever reason, be granted a 
right to life. Some would restrict 
the decision as to what qualities 
bestow value upon life to the in-
dividual whose life it is. This view 
is very hard to maintain, however, 
because it cannot apply to the very 
young, the senile, the severely men-
tally ill or those who have lost their 
capacity for conscious life. If mercy 
killing is to be applied in such 
instances, it cannot be considered 
voluntary at the time in which peo-
ple find themselves to be in one 
of those conditions.ts 
Someone may argue that there 
is really no alternative to a quality 
of life view. There are occasions 
when it seems necessary to sacri-
fice life. One could cite here the 
declaration of one highly revered 
patriot when he exclaims "Give 
me liberty or give me death! " How-
ever, this affirmation need not be 
made from the standpoint of a qual-
ity of life ethic. One can take the 
view that life is a significant good 
in itself to which every individual 
has a right and, at the same time, 
claim that there are other values 
of great significance to which in-
dividuals have a right, such as lib-
erty and justice. 
There are situations in which 
the deprivation of liberty or the 
perpetuation of injustices are so 
severe that one might well moral-
ly justify risk to one's life and 
limb in order to increase liberty 
·or decrease injustice. In a situa-
187 
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tion of enslavement, for example, 
there may be a point at which the 
sacrifice of some lives may bring · 
about the kind of freedom and jus-
tice that will greatly reduce suffer-
ing and death among the enslaved. 
Civil disobedience, rebellion, or 
even revolution may, under certain 
circumstances, satisfy the criteria 
involved for waging a just war. 
Using the just war criteria, the re-
spect for life is never lost. One 
can never kill in order to improve 
one's material welfare or happiness. 
But one may wage war to rectify 
grave injustices and overcome op-
pression. The injustices and op-
pression of slavery can be so great 
that those who are slaves experi-
ence a great deal of premature 
death, whether as infants or adults 
deprived of proper care, or as 
young people or adults so poorly 
fed and worked so hard that the 
usual chances for a normal life 
expectancy are severely reduced . 
any system of justice. Rather th e 
rights have to be earned in sc e 
way. 
Ethical or political systems t .t 
entertain a merit view of jus e 
are at fundamental odds. with e 
principle of equity. In John Ra· s' 
recent monumental work on just e, 
he recognizes that certain kind! Jf 
inequities, for example differer ..!S 
in income, may be justifiable Jt 
only if all persons, including t' se 
with less income, stand to bene •s 
From the standpoint of those .10 
see life as a good in itself, li is 
one of those benefits . From he 
standpoint of certain qualit; of 
life arguments, however, life m-
der certain circumstances is wt 
considered a benefit. 
The right to life, therefore, is 
fundamentally linked to maintain-
ing and respecting rights to liberty 
and justice. In the case of the Mon-
goloid child, the complete depriva-
tion of liberty- the child is not 
allowed to grow up and decide for 
itself whether life is worth living 
- means in that case the complete 
loss of the right to live. Similarly, 
where abnormalities such as men-
tal retardation are used to decide 
the merit of a life, a merit view 
of justice is brought into play. 
The merit vi'ew of justice does not 
presume that each individual has 
an equal right to life, liberty, and 
the goods of this world, including 
due process, the cornerstone of 
188 
Utilitarian 
This brings us to another im-
portant normative question. \lot 
only does one's system of ~ 1ics 
hinge on the particular value uch 
as life, liberty, and justice af-
firmed by it, but also on the ode 
of moral reasoning employed :::>ne 
common method of moral rl >on-
ing is what is called in ethic util-
itarian. A system of ethics th: em-
ploys only utilitarian reason g is 
one in which the rightnes and 
wrongness of actions, and the .ood-
ness of persons and of social ~nds, 
are all judged by some stand rd of 
utility. The rights of individt lis to 
life, liberty, and justice at not 
presumed. Such rights must >e es-
tablished by their utility. 
One of the narrower fo1 ms of 
contemporary utilitarian t•.:ason-
ing is that of judging poliltcs by 
computing their cost effect iveness. 
If the uti! i ty of a project l: xcecds 
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its di_sutility, it can be justified. 
Thus m medical literature one finds 
arguments for aborting deformed 
fetuses on the · grounds that the 
costs of aborting are so much less 
th~n the costs of sustaining the 
c~tl~ren who would be born.' 7 
Stmtlarly there are those who ar-
gue that the costs of certain kinds 
of treatment, where the chances 
~f recovery are statistically highly 
Improbable or involve people who 
are poor risks, may justify with-
holdmg treatment from such 
individuals. 
Formalistic modes of norma-
tive reasoning are to be distin-
~ished from utilitarian modes 
·~ that formalists allege that the 
nghtness or wrongness of actions 
or practices does not depend sole-
ly ~pon their consequences. For-
~~hst~ .ne~d not, therefore, reject 
utlhtanan reasoning but 
util't see 
• y as. a~ most one right-making 
~-haractensttc of actions and prac-
•ces am~ng others such as justice, 
truth-telhng, gratitude, reparation ~tc. One of the most widely re~ 
pect~d and regnant formalist sys-
te~ IS that of W. D . Ross .Is 
. he question no doubt arises 
m _the .minds of our readers at this 
~dmt JUSt how it is that one de-
CI es that · of . certam characteristics 
actions are right- or wrong-
~aking characteristics, and certain 
c aracteristics of things or s . I 
ends a octa 
lated t~ g~. or evil. C losely re-
ti thts IS the further ques-
gron as to what individuals and 
m
oups . speak with authority on 
oral ISsues . . . it . 10 medtcme a nd what 
Th
iS that confers such authority 
ese are q · · uestwns of metaethics 
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to which we now turn. 
Metaethical Questions for 
Medicine 
. There has been, and there con-
tt~u~s to be a strong presumption 
wtthm the profession of medicine 
that the profession itself provides 
t~e best basis for deciding what is 
ngh~ and wrong in questions of 
me?tca~ research and care. Medical 
ethtcs 10 this view is defined, un-
derstood, and practiced by medi-
cal pr~fessionals. Among medical 
professiOnals, those with a doctor's 
de~ree in medicine carry the most 
wet~ht. The proposition that a 
particular group is best qualified 
to make and to criticize moral judg-
ments pertaining to their own in-
terests and work is not self-evidently 
~rue or false. Whether one believes 
It to be true or false depends in 
large measure on one's view of the 
nature of moral judgments and mor-
al decision-making processes. 
. ~ook~ on medical ethics by spe-
ctahsts rn ethics do not uniformly 
presuppose the special expertise 
of the medical profession to make 
moral judgments about medical 
cases. Joseph F letcher in Morals 
and Medicine does not presume 
to be doing medical ethics.'9 
~letch_er claims that he is deal-
lOg wtth the ethics of medical care 
and th at in so doing he is not 
dealing with medical ethics, a term 
~sually used for the rules govern-
mg the soc_ial conduct and graces 
of the medtcal profession: "Medi-
cal ethics is the business of th 
d' e me teal profession, a lthough cer-
ta!nl~ it has to fall somewhat 
wtthiO the limits of social obli-
.gation." 2° Fletcher recognizes 
189 
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that some professionals would 
give medical ethics as a profes-
sional concern a loftier definition. 
He cites Dr. George Jacoby as 
saying that medical ethics deals 
with " the question of the general 
attitude of the physician toward 
the patient: to what extent his duty 
obligates him to intervene in the 
patient's interest, and what de-
mands the physician has a right 
and duty to make upon the pa-
tient's relatives in regard to obe-
dience and subordination for the 
purposes of treatment." 2 1 Fletcher 
notes that Dr. Jacoby nowhere says 
anything about the demands the 
patient has a right and duty to 
make upon physicians. Fletcher 
then claims that it is this other 
perspective, namely the patient's 
point of view, that he tries to take 
in examining the morals, principles 
and values that are at stake in 
medical care. 
from ethics ge.nerally is its n-
cern with the moral questions at 
arise in and from the practic of 
medicine. 
Thus when Paul Ramsey set ut 
to write a book on patient care. n-
titled The Patient as Person. he 
subtitle is "Explorations in ~ Ji-
cal Ethics."zz In the prefac to 
his book, he makes his vie• of 
the relation between medical th-
ics and ethics generally ver) ;:x-
plicit: 
problems of medical ethics . 
are by no means technical pr 
terns o n which only the expert 
this case, the phys ician) can h 
Despite Fletcher's distinction be-
tween an ethics of medical care 
and medical ethics as professional 
e thics, his own book is virtually 
always referred to as a book in 
medical ethics. When . physicians 
speak of the book in this way, 
I think it is because they presume 
that the issues raised by Fletcher 
are issues for them as profession-
als: nothing about medical care is 
outside the expertise of the physi-
cian ; certainly no thing about med-
ical care is outside the concern of 
the physician. When ethicists refer 
to Fletcher's . book as a book in 
medical ethics, they share the as-
sumption that medical ethics is 
part of ethics generally and that 
what distinguishes medical ethics 
190 
a n opinion. They are rather ~ 
problems of human beings in 
ua tio ns in which ·medical car• s 
needed. Birth and· death, illness d 
injury, are not s imply events e 
doctor attends. They are mom ts 
in every human life. 
. . . The question, What 0 1 tl t 
the doctor to do? is only a pa --
ular form of the question, V. at 
should be done? 
... I hold that medical ethi is 
consonant with the ethics of a " er 
human community. The form• is 
(however special) only a partie .ar 
case of the latter. T he moral req• ·e-
ments governing the relation of 
physician to patients and reser ch-
er to subjects are only a sp ·ial 
case of the moral requirements J V-
erning any relations between •tan 
and man. Canons o f loyalty II pa-
tients or to joint adventure. . in 
medical research are simply p . tic-
ular manifestat ions of canons o loy-
a lty of person to person genera.lyP 
Ramsey has the utmost , espect 
for the moral sensitivity of physi-
cians. Nevertheless, he ts not 
sanguine that the medical profes-
sion and its codes will su!fice to 
guide contemporary m~dicine 
through its ethical dilemmas: 
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In the medical literature there 
are many articles on ethics which 
are greatly to be admired. Yet I 
kn~w that these are not part of the 
dally fare of medical students, or 
of members of the profession when 
they gather together .as profession-
a~s . o~ even for purposes of ccn-
Vtvtahty. I do not believe tha t either 
the codes of medical ethics or the 
physicians who have undertaken to 
comment on them and to give 
fresh analysis of the physician's 
moral decisions will suffice to with-
s~nd . the omnivorous appetite of 
~·entlfic research or of a therapeu-
tic technology that has a momentum 
and a life of its own. 
T~e Nuremberg Code, the Dec-
~ratton of Helsinki, various "guide-
hn~s"_of the American Medical As-
SOCiation, and other "codes" e . gov-
rnmg medical practice constitute 
a sort of "catechism" in the e thics 
of the medical profession. T hese 
c~es exhibit a prOfessional ethics 
whtch ministers and theologians 
and members of other professions 
~:n _only ~rofoundly respect and 
mtre. Still, a catechism never 
sufficed. Unless these principles 
~re constantly pondered a nd en-
livened in their application they 
become dead letters. There is a lso 
need tha t these principles be deep-
ened and sensitized and opened to 
~~her humane revision in face of 
: th~ ordinary and the newl y 
mergmg situations which a doc-
~or confronts - as do we all -
tn the present day. In th is task 
~ne of the sources of moral in-
stght_, no understanding of the hu-
manity of 
. man or for a nsweri ng 
q_uesttons of life and death can 
rtghtfully be neglected.~4 ' 
Th' cal rs _does not mean that medi-
tr 
. ethtcs is best left to those 
atned · . tn ethics only. Ramsey 
argues th t h . . ical . . a p ystclans can do med-
ethlcs but · 
tra
. . not Without some 
lntng . h' . . tn et tcs; Similarly ethi-
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cists need exposure to the fields 
of medicine to which their ethical 
reflections .are directed. Above all 
Ramsey argues that the medicai 
~rofession should no longer be-
lieve_ t_hat the personal integrity of 
physicians alone is enough " t dea~ with the contemporary quan~ 
danes of medical ethics."zs 
Whereas Ramsey does not become 
explici~ .about the metaethical pre-
suppositions that inform his view 
a recent essay by Robert Veatch 
doe~.z6 This essay argues on the-
oretical grounds that medical ethics 
~hould not be the province of med-
~ca l practitioners only and that med-
ICal decisions cannot be morally 
justified if they are construed as 
matters of personal opinion. The 
fact that these decisions of medical 
care are made by physicians does 
not by itself suffice to raise them 
above ~he level of personal opinion. 
In dlscus~ing the relationship be-
tween medtcal ethics and ethics 
generally, Veatch describes a com-
mon debate that occurs between 
those trained in medicine and those 
who are not. Veatch cites a case 
where a woman was diagnosed to 
be dying from cancer. The medical 
student who presents the case con-
siders it appropriate to tell the 
woman gently and diplomatically 
that although the medical staff will 
~o all_ that it can to treat her condi-
tiOn, It cannot give her assurances 
that she will recover. The physi -
c~an who is the student's super-
~~s_or ~nd _the other physicians par-
tlctpatmg m the discussion to which 
Veatch alludes claimed that as 
physicians they have a unique ethi-
cal duty to do no harm to the pa-
19 1 
tient. The physicians were i_n agree-
ment that telling the patient she 
has cancer will harm her and ther~­
fore it is wrong to tell her thiS. 
Non-physicians discussing_ t_his case 
disagreed with the physlcl~ns re-
garding the factual questwn of 
whether the bad news about can-
cer would adversely affect the 
patient and also as to whether the 
decision ought finally to be ba~ed 
on the principle of not har~mg 
or on the principle of ~th-telhng. 
What raises the metaethlcal ques-
tion here is the claim of th~ phy-
sicians that their understa~dm~ of 
moral norms or principles IS umque 
to the medical profession and should 
be given priority in medical cases 
over the judgments of non-profes-
sionals. . 
ethical theory that the peculi; ty 
of moral assertions is prect ly 
that they are assertions that c m 
to be universalizable.28 In ~ er 
words the decision not to tel he 
truth ~o a dying patient is one .at 
one would expect any right~tl k-
ing person to make if o~e m let 
claims that this is the nght ci-
sion in cases of this sort: . 
Personal RelatiVISm · 
The difficulties of relati ;tic 
theories of ethics cannot be or-
oughly discussed here ~ut have ;en 
elsewhere.29 There IS, hov Jer, 
another point at issue tha de-
serves some elaboration. !ere 
are those among physicians and 
this view seems . to be quite om-
moo who assume that mor de-
cisi;ns are personal decision and 
Veatch argues that these physi-
cians were actually claiming th~t 
there are specific moral rules appl_l-
ble in medicine which are vahd 
that physicians can do_ no f\ore 
than other human bemgs :hen 
faced with moral dilemmas,_ hich 
is to search diligently thei own 
consciences. This presumpt n is 
also a metaethical positic for 
which the medical literatun gives 
ca . . d 
for physicians qua physiCians, an 
h t 1 this no justification. Wit respec 
form of relativism, ethical Ieory 
is more divided, but at thl same 
· t and time strong objectwns o 
hard 
Plausible alternatives are m h .. pur-to find.3o It is enoug ,or o 
that the general rules and expect~­
tions of the larger society may, m 
specific cases, be justifiably abro-
gated by them. As Veatch notes, 
this is an implicit acceptance. ~f a 
particular . metaethical pos~tl~n, 
namely that of social relatiVISm 
which argues that to say of a~ ac-
tion that it is right or wron~ IS to 
that it is in accord With the say h . 
poses here simply to indic. ; that 
one of the working assumpt ms of 
. . . t < le for 
some physicians IS no . at 
mores of one's group. Veatc ~s 
quite right in asserting that this 
metaethical position is not one 
that ethicists would defendP It 
is a meaningful question to _ask 
whether anything considered nght 
or wrong by one's group is in fact 
right or wrong. Indeed, it is a grow-
ing consensus in contemporary 
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which they have offered ltiOn 
and cogent arguments. Wh ,-e o~e 
I n IS-stands with respect to sue a 
sue makes a lot of differ<: lee for 
one's conception of the n;,wre of 
. n as an 
medicine as a science a l 
. · that 
art. It goes w1thout sayi ng .. 
those who implicitly or explicitlY 
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adhere to doctrines of social or 
personal relativism in ethics can 
more easily justify the private and/ 
or professional ·nature of medical 
ethics, feeling no intellectual or 
moral obligation to know what is 
discovered by professional ethicists 
or even what is thought to be right 
or wrong by the general public ex-
cept insofar as opinions of the 
public may represent political and/or 
legal power to influence decisions 
by medical practitioners. 
There is another important impli-
cation of metaethical theories like 
social and personal relativism. If 
one is a social relativist, there is 
no way to decide who among differ-
ing groups should have the say re-
garding questions of right or wrong. 
Personal relativism is also ultimate-
ly ~ithout a basis. for adjudicating 
disputes among groups or persons. 
In practice, relativists tend to give 
the nod in moral decisions to the 
persons who have the most exper-
tise regarding the factual data rele-
vant to the decisions being made. 
This means that where the doctors 
of medicine are considered the ex-
perts par excellence in matters of 
health, they are granted the ulti-
mate power of moral decision-
making in medical cases. Veatch 
refers to this as the fallacy of gen-
eralization of expertise. It is a fal-
lacy because, as Veatch and other 
ethicists generally hold, moral 
decisions are not based only upon 
factual matters narrowly defined. 
Furthermore, the same facts are 
~n differently from the perspec-
tive Qf various disciplines. 
The value of truth for a dying 
patient may quite justifiably be 
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perceived quite differently by 
someone like a minister who may 
well consider it a great benefit for 
all concerned if dying persons face 
the question of their own dying. 
This kind of benefit may or may 
not be accepted on purely medical 
grounds depending upon one's 
conception of health and of medi-
cine as well as one's conception 
of the relation between bodily and 
psychic functions. In any event, 
the judgment as to whether one 
ought to reflect upon one's dying is 
not self-evidently a strictly medical 
decision, even if the term health 
is stretched to cover every aspect 
of a person's well-being. Health so 
defined becomes the concern of 
everyone, including a great variety 
of professionals in addition to those 
trained in medicine. 
Albeit in a very preliminary way, 
our discussion of metaethical as-
sumptions illustrates some of the 
ways in which metaethical theories, 
whether held implicitly or explicitly, 
influence very practical or strategic 
questions of moral policy, such as 
who will be accorded the authority 
and power to decide moral issues 
in medical care and how the deci-
sions made will be implemented. 
In short, metaethical theories have 
great practical import for moral 
strategy or policy. This is so be-
cause metaethical theory is a the-
ory about the nature of the proc-
esses of moral decision-making, 
particularly of the kind of justifi-
cation that one offers for one's 
moral judgments. Metaethics seeks 
to assess the extent to which such 
justifications are rational or irra-
tional, subjective or objective, and 
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private or universalizable. Let us 
look at some of the practical moral 
problems of medical decision-mak-
ing and raise some questions about 
these in the light of certain meta-
ethical criteria. 
Questions of Moral Policy 
for Medicine 
Moral policy refers to that por-
tion of the total ethical enterprise 
in which whatever is known or be-
lieved to be true in normative the-
ory as well as metaethical theory 
is applied to specific moral issues 
and the methods used to cope with 
them. Decisions about what is right 
or wrong, good or bad, are not sole-
ly decided, nor ought they to be, on 
the basis of ethical theory per se. 
Ethical theory provides one of the 
essential components of any ade-
quate moral decision, namely a meth-
od of moral reasoning. 
sons.3t An example of a q st-
theological assumption that gr tly 
influences policy would be tat 
persons are very prone to evil. nd 
hence Jaws and sanctions are ;ry 
important for preventing evt as 
compared with an assumption 1at 
people are prone to do what is od 
and interference in their fre Jm 
tends to be more harmful than . le-
ficial. Some of the disputes a1 mg 
physicians about the regulati< of 
research often reflect a diffe nee 
of opinion as to whether in<. •id-
uals doing research are more 1 one 
to be influenced by desire~ for 
money, advancement, and tme 
or by the desire to know the uth 
and benefit humanity. Obv: tsly 
the direction of one's thinking 1out 
policy can be tipped in one ' rec-
tion or another by such cons era-
tions. 
Wielding power in dec ion-
Moral reasoning about specific 
moral issues, such as whether to do 
or to have an abortion, a steriliza-
tion, a kidney transplant, etc. has 
two components: reasoning about 
general principles as illustrated by 
our discussion of the difference be-
tween formalists and utilitarians; 
reasoning as to the best processes 
by which to arrive at a decision. Pol-
icy debates, however, hinge not only 
on the nature of one's moral reason-
ing but on the perception one has 
of relevant facts, the kinds of loyal-
ties one has, such as loyalties to 
one's family, . one's ethnic group, 
one's profession, one's religion, one's 
nation, etc., and also one's more 
theological or quasi-theological as-
sumptions about the nature of real-
ity, particularly the nature of per-
making depends a great dea up-
on who has the facts that ar- rel-
evant to what is being de< Jed. 
Physicians have a great deal ol >OW-
er in medical cases by reas .1 of 
their express certification to 1ake 
diagnoses and engage in int ven-
tion where assistance in matt rs of 
health is being sought and b rea-
son of the general respect ace )rded 
this certification by the pubL. · and 
by other professionals conLa n_ed 
with health and illness, such as mm-
isters, lawyers, judges, polit.cians, 
etc. It is also important to note that 
there are a whole range of ()(;cupa-
tional roles other than that of the 
physician involved in medical car~. 
These persons, such as nurses, physi-
otherapists, counselors, voluntarY 
aides, etc., tend to have a definite-
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ly subordinate role in medical de-
cision-making wherever these per-
sons Jack an M.D. 
There are two strategies, there-
fore, that serve to secure the power 
of the licensed physician to have 
the final say in matters of medical 
care: one is to perpetuate the no-
tion that the proper knowledge of 
medicine is conferred by those in-
stitutions accredited to grant the 
M.D. degree; the other is to keep 
the precious knowledge possessed 
by the holder of the M.D. within 
the confines of that profession and 
to share it as little as possible with 
any other professional or with the 
patient. 
Sharing of Power 
Now we are not arguing that the 
power and role of expert knowl-
edge per se be diminished or deni-
grated. The question before us is 
rather the extent to which the pow-
er that comes from possessing such 
knowledge should be shared and to 
what extent. 
Consider the following case: a 
man is seriously ill, so ill that there 
is. a high probability that he may 
dte.sz The physician does not con-
vey this to the patient nor does 
he inform the man's minister of 
this diagnosis. A nurse, however, 
connected with the case takes it 
upon herself to tell the man's min-
ister before he sees the patient of 
~recisely how serious the man's 
illness · · ts JUdged to be. The minis-
te~, with some trepidation, but 
With firm resolve, decides to share 
this information with the patient. 
When this incident was reported 
to a class of graduate students in 
rei' . tgton, some of whom were train-
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ing for the mmtstry and some of 
whom were obtaining higher de-
grees specializing in ethics, there 
was considerable criticism of the 
minister's action. Many felt that 
the minister should not have taken 
this upon himself without consult-
ing with the doctor. Indeed some 
felt strongly that the minister must 
have the attending physician's con-
sent to talk to the patient about 
dying. The minister in this instance 
disagreed sharply. He viewed the 
man who was in danger of dying 
as one who was not only paying 
the physician to carry out whatever 
duties were incumbent upon him 
as a physician, but as one who was 
also paying the minister to carry out 
his duties. The question as to wheth-
er a person who may be dying should 
reflect upon this possibility or actu-
ality as the case may be is as much 
a question of the welfare of the pa-
tient as the question as to whether 
discussions of dying will have an 
adverse physical effect upon a pa-
tient. The difficult question as to 
whether in fact a particular patient 
will have adverse physical reac-
tions to the topic of death - it 
appears that this is much less often 
the case than is supposed - is not 
the critical question if one's con-
cern about the patient is for that 
patient's total welfare. A lawyer 
or a friend or a relative concerned 
about whether a proper will has 
been made out, a minister con-
cerned about whether persons have 
achieved a proper attitude toward 
their own limited powers as human 
beings, a nurse concerned with the 
anxieties of patients who want to 
'know, all raise important considera-
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tions about what is beneficial for 
patients . If physicians are the only 
ones who know that a given per-
son is dying, the power of what is 
best for the patient in the light of 
that fact resides totally with him 
or with her. Is this the way it ought 
to be? 
quires consent · and the neces y 
for consent is only waived in -
treme emergency to save · I ·s 
where it is not possible to ob n 
consent in the time required. I r-
thermore, as indicated in- the ; •-
cles of the Nuremberg tribu tl , 
any procedure considered to >e 
experimental is acknowledgec as 
requiring informed and volur ry 
consent of the patient or sot ::\. 
Although this requirement is s• te-
times violated in spirit oc .quit it-
erally, nevertheless these viola ms 
are considered deviations fron ac-
cepted norms of medical pra ice 
and are subject to censure and eg-
ative sanctions. Nevertheless, is 
still the case that . physicians h :ely 
control, on an individual an< ;ol-
lective basis, what informati · is 
conveyed to patients. They als< ·on-
trot, for the most part, what for-
One immediate reaction to this 
question is that it depends upon 
the particular case that one has in 
mind. But that response misses the 
point of the question, which is the 
question as to whether it is best 
for attending physicians to make 
the decision that they indeed will 
be the only ones who know the 
prognosis of patients. It is of course 
the case that many physicians, wheth-
er for moral reasons or for others, 
will share their knowledge of the 
prognosis of a patient, sometimes 
only with persons responsible for 
the care of that patient, sometimes 
with those persons as well as with 
relatives and friends of patients, 
and sometimes with all of these 
and patients as well. The question 
mation is conveyed to all ners 
concerned with the welfat of 
is what persons should be involved 
in the decision about who shares 
in this knowledge? 
Information Controlled 
The principle that some knowl-
edge must be shared with patients 
is well established. We are not 
therefore talking about totally 
withholding information from pa-
tients or from other persons con-
cerned with patients' care and well-
being. Patients, or those who are 
spokesmen for patients, sign con-
sent forms that include some details 
about medical interventions that 
are being contemplated. Surgical 
interference, for example, re-
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patients. 
Now this situation may b seen 
to be less than optimum in ,. least 
two major ways. First of a the 
knowledge possessed by phy cians 
by reason of their training ' im-
portant to know if the P· ient's 
welfare is to be served, bt it is 
not the only knowledge that ;s rel-
evant to the welfare of p tients. 
Secondly, moral decision- taking 
involves a process that i1 eludes 
knowledge of factual info• nation 
as one of its important comr Jnents, 
but not as its only componc;lt. The 
first point involves many intaesting 
questions that we do not ha>c space 
to discuss here: questions about con· 
ceptions of health and disease, and 
conceptions of what various kinds 
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of expertise contribute to the en-
hancement of health the d' . 
. • lmtnU-
tiOn of disease and the . 
. . . . • mcrease 
m. mdlVldual and community well-
bemg. The role and scope of con-
temporary med' · . •cme · m enhancing 
human well-being is not self-evident ~me of its benefits to those whos~ 
hves have b~en s~ved and length-
ened are fauly mdisputable b t 
contemporary medicine with i~ 
armament of powerful drugs its 
quest for new knowledge thr~ h r~search using humans, does ~~t 
a ways engage in practices that are 
non-controversially beneficial. 
!he second point is one that re-
qul~_es some comment. As we noted 
ear .'~r, the components of moral 
dectslon-making and th 
th
. e nature of 
ts proce · ss IS what a metaeth' I 
theory · d . 1ca Des . ts e~tgned to elucidate. 
ptte certam variations am 
theorists · d . ong in m etatl, there is a grow-
m! co?sensus in contemporary 
m taethtcal theory that moral judg-
th:tsth are rational to the degree 
rei 
. ey are factually informed 
al!vely d' · • 
d
. tsmterested relatively 
tspassionate d ' . 
of a v· . . ' an made m the light 
othe tvad amagination as to how 
or ~ ru:e affe~ted by the action 
p acl!ce be10g decided 33 Th 
power d · e tio an role of factual informa-
n we hav 1 Th e a ready illustrated 
decC:t·oother _components of morai 
n·mak10g · ficatio ment some clari-
interes~~The best examples of dis-
ness ness and dispassionate-
are found · h USed t 10 t e procedures 
o govern J. d' · 1 in th u tcta processes 
e courtroo Th . Would m. us JUdges 
not be s their . een as fit to try 
OWn chaldre 1 nor 'f n or oved ones 
t they owned stock . ' m a com-
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pany, to judge an alleged wrong-
doing of that company. We have 
c~me, albeit belatedly, to recog-
n_tze .some of the subtleties of ra-
ctal mterest, if not prejudice and 
we ac~ accordingly to see ' that 
bl_ack JUrors are involved in the 
tn.als of blacks. In a perfect world 
thts would not in princi pie be nec-
essary but that is not the kind of 
w?rld that we live in, certainly not 
wath respect to the way our judg-
ments are influenced by o . ur mter-
ests and our passions.34 
Experiments 
.Th~ physician-patient relation-
ship . ts ~reatly simplified if the 
relatiOnshtp is purely bet 
P
h . . ween 
ystct~ns who are committed to 
constr~mt from doing any harm 
to pattents and to employing only 
those thera t' . peu tc mterventions 
~hat can reasonably be expected to 
Improve the conditions of t' H patents. 
owever, many physicians are part 
of the ceaseless quest of mod d' . ern 
me . tcme for knowledge so that 
~attents ~an also become subjects 
10 expenments and as such rna 
find t~emselves at the receiving en~ 
~f nsk-filled interventions that 
. ave a low, or even no, probabil-
tty of benefiting them. 
Physicians who also see th -
selves as · · em 
. scientists cannot be 
vtewed as disinterested parties in 
t~e care and welfare of their pa-
ttents. Because of the great power 
tha~ physicians have by reason of 
thet~ knowledge, the requirement 
of tnformed consent where the 
knowledge of the procedures are 
conveyed by the scientist-physician 
~ardly guarantees that disinterested 
JUdgments as to what are justified 
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risks will be made. This is one of 
the reasons why procedures for 
achieving more disinterestedness 
in decisions involving experimen-
tation have been set up by agencies 
such as the FDA and NIH.35 In-
creasingly these agencies are also 
recognizing that the committees 
that are to review research before 
it will be funded by government 
money should include non-scien-
tists and non-physicians who will 
help to represent interests that are 
not primarily those of a medical 
scientist or even a physician. Such 
persons may take a harder look at 
the scientific merit of proposed 
.experiments, but equally if not 
more important is their role in 
articulating the point of view and 
interests of those who are potential 
subjects in any experiment. 
Increasing the representation of 
interests that are non-medical and 
non-research oriented not only 
serves to protect individuals but 
also serves to determine whether 
or not certain kinds of medical in-
terventions will create desirable 
or undesirable social policies. To 
take one extreme example, deci-
sions to und·ertake experiments to 
perfect the technique of in-vitro 
fertilization, that is of creating and 
sustaining human life outside the 
womb, may well be motivated by 
the physicians' desire to provide 
children for couples who would 
otherwise be childless. However, 
these experiments and their re-
sults, while hypothetically bene-
ficial on an individual basis, may 
not represent a sound social policy. 
The question of regulation is not 
one that physicians can be expected 
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to be disinterested or dispa on-
ate about. By the same token hy-
sicians can rightly claim th< un-
informed lay persons may ave 
their views of this distorh by 
their passions and interests f he 
whole purpose of democrati1 ' ro-
cesses from a moral point o iew 
is to achieve a higher meas• ; of 
disinterestedness, dispassi ate-
ness, and vivid imagination c 1ow 
various parties are affected i one 
policy or another. To acco Jlish 
this, democratic processes s1 -: to 
maximize participation of ( erse 
interests, or at least to achie\ rep-
resentation of those diverse Jter-
ests and to establish proc ures 
by which persons and grou are 
guaranteed due process . 
Here we touch on one the 
critical strategic moral iss• s in 
contemporary medicine. T.l re-
lations between physicians a I pa-
tients are not governed put y by 
the moral conscientiousnc of 
physicians and the sophist ation 
of patients. Groups like thl poor 
and blacks suffer ill health 1 part 
because, for various reason they 
either do not avail themse es of 
existing medical care for which 
they are eligible, or when t ey ~o 
so, they encounter difficult .:s tn· 
tentionally or unintentional . per· 
petrated by persons and modes 
of care that are not well under· 
stood or appreciated, and which 
may or may not be best fm them. 
Again, this situation is only ~ar· 
tially rectified by injecting tnto 
the delivery of medical care ~r­
sons from ethnic and/or minonty 
groups that are not now wd l rep· 
resented. There are also larger 
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policy questions having to do 
with health education, with al-
leviation of poverty, with the lo-
cation and nature of health facili-
ties, and also with the locus and 
nature of the administrative con-
trol of these facilities. 
Clearly, our brief essay could 
only encompass a framework for 
discussion. There are so many 
questions that require substantive 
analysis. Our failure to take up 
some of these questions in great-
er detail is not due to a Jack of 
desire but rather to a self-confessed 
choice that it was important to put 
some of these questions into a 
larger framework, a framework 
suggested by the nature and scope 
of the ethical enterprise itself. 
There is no question that the as-
sumption throughout has been 
that the concerns of the medical 
profession and of medical ethics 
as an enterprise are very much the 
concern of everyone but particu-
larly of ethicists who reflect on the 
most general nature of ethics and 
moral decision-making. In no way 
do we wish to minimize thereby the 
significance and the benefits of the 
expertise that comes to us from 
medicine. We have only suggested 
~ays of thinking and of formulat-
Ing policy that may increase these 
benefits for all concerned. 
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Linacre QuarterlY 
Doctors Ezzo and Barker de-
scribe the health program for re-
ligious that has been in operation 
for several years in . the St. Peters-
burg, Fla. , Diocese. The article of-
fers a blueprint to diocesan officials 
and doctors in other parts of the 
country who are concerned about 
the health care of religious per-
sonnel in their areas. 
Both authors are in private prac-
tice in St. Petersburg: Dr. Ezzo in 
internal medicine and cardiology, 
Dr. Barker as a surgeon. Among 
other honors, Dr. Ezzo is a Diplo-
mate of the American Board of 
Internal Medicine and a Fellow 
of the American College of Physi-
cians, and Dr. Barker is a Diplo-
mate of the American Board of 
Surgery. 
The St. Petersburg 
Diocesan Health Program 
Joseph A. Ezzo, M.D. and 
Arthur J . Barker, M.D. 
In an effort to render our priests 
and sisters better health services, 
Catholic guilds in some areas have 
instituted programs for periodic 
physical examinations and foll ow-
up care. Programs vary from mass 
screening to intensive, individual 
diagnostic surveys, but few of these 
attempts have been successful. We 
believe the program that started 
in 1968 in the St. Petersburg, Fla., 
Diocese is meeting with reasonable 
success and we are outlining it in 
The Linacre Quarterly as a guide 
for other guilds. 
The objectives of our program: 
I. To get a comprehensive his-
tory and physical examination doc-
umented on all religious in the dio-
cese. 
2. To establish doctor-patient 
relationships with all of them. 
3. To detect asymptomatic dis-
ease and advise therapy as indi -
cated. 
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4 . To orient the religious to 
their health needs. 
Health Kit 
To do this, a "health kit" has 
been produced and distributed to 
every priest and sister in the dio-
cese. It contains three essential 
components: 
I. An explanatory letter of di-
rection. Essentially this explains 
the program and asks the examinee 
to fill out the enclosed health ques-
tionnaire; to make an appointment 
with the physician of his or her 
choice in the month of birth ; to 
bring a urine specimen (clean-
catch, first-voided morning speci-
men) and to report to the doctor's 
office in a fasting state. 
2. T he health questionnaire. 
This is a comprehensive 12-page 
questionnaire (similar to the Cor-
nell Medical Index) that seems 
best sui ted to our purposes. "Con-
fidential" is printed in large let-
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